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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Estate of
HARVARD L. WHEADON,
Deceased.

Case No.

15329

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case arises under the provisions of Utah's Lost Will
Statute, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 75-3-26 (1953), and involves the
issue of whether a lost will may be admitted to probate upon proof of
its legal existence (non-revocation) or whether proof of its actual,
physical existence at the time of the testator's death is required.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury; however, the lower court took
the case from the jury upon objectors'-respondents' Motion for a Directed
Verdict.

The lower court held that a lost will may not be admitted to

probate merely upon proof of due execution, content and non-revocation.
The court stated that before a lost will can be admitted to probate, it
must be shown to have been in actual, physical existence at the time of
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the testator's death.

Since physical existence was not shown, the court

refused to admit the lost will to probate.
The_petitioners-appellants moved the court for a directed
verdict upon the ground that the due execution, contents and non-revocation of the lost will had been established by unrefuted evidence, and
that it should be admitted to probate as a matter of law.

This motion

was denied by the lower court.
Petitioners-appellants moved the court for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 58, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and said motion was
also denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioners-appellants seek reversal of the judgment and
judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new
trial.
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I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decedent, Harvard L. Wheadon, an unmarried man, died on
April 14, 1976 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, leaving real and
personal property situate in said County and State.
On May 24, 1955, decedent duly executed a will (a conformed
copy of which was introduced at trial; the contents of which are uncontroverted) leaving all his property, both personal and real, to his
brother, Melvin S. Wheadon.

The will gave nothing to his other brothers

and sister, objectors and respondents herein.

(Transcript 1-18; Exhibit

1-P)
In addition, the will named said Melvin S. Wheadon as the
executor of the estate.

(Transcript 1-21)

Melvin S. Wheadon died on

February 4, 1971, leaving two daughters, Ellen Wheadon Piercey and Iris
Wheadon Jensen, petitioners and appellants herein.
2-45)

(Transcript 2-36,

Within 15 days of Melvin S. Wheadon's death, the decedent,

Harvard L. Wheadon, executed a codicil to his last will and testament,
whereby he changed his will to provide that Judy Burton and Sue Bateman
should serve as the co-executrices of his estate.
2-3)

(Exhibit 2-P; Transcript

All other provisions of the will remained unaltered thus providing

that his entire estate should go to the estate of his then-deceased
brother, Melvin S. Wheadon.

(Exhibits 1-P, 2-P)

The original will has not yet been located and it is not known
whether decedent ever had possession of the document.
it in his possession.

No one ever saw

Neither Mr. Everett Dahl, decedent's attorney,

nor Mr. Dahl's former secretary, Ann Dahl, ever remembers having given
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the document to the decedent.

(Transcript 1-23, 24)

Evidence showed

merely that on occasion, Mr. Dahl would give the original document to
the testator.

(Transcript 1-23)

Mr. Dahl testified that, in 1955, it

was his practice, if asked by the client, to keep the original document.
(Transcript 1-23, 2-27)
will or not.

He did not recall whether he kept the executed

(Transcript 1-23)

Nine years after the will was executed,

Mr. Dahl and his partner separated and each took his own clients'
documents.

(Transcript 2-5)

At this same time, an inventory was made

of the wills Mr. Dahl had in his possession.

(Transcript 2-5)

That

inventory showed that Mr. Dahl did not have the decedent's will in his
possession.

(Transcript 1-24; 2-6)

Mr. Dahl also testified that it was

his practice in 1955 to give a copy of the original will to the client.
(Transcript 1-23).

Shortly after the decedent's death, Mr. Dahl and his

staff made a diligent search of his office and his files in order to
locate the original will.

Neither the will nor a copy of it was found

as a result of this search.

(Transcript 2-9; 2-12)

However, on the day

of trial, Mr. Dahl made another search for the missing will.

At that

time, he discovered the unexecuted copy of the will in his files, even
though his prior diligence in searching had failed to locate it.
(Transcript 2-11)
In 1971, when decedent executed his codicil, he insisted that
Mr. Dahl retain the original document.

(Transcript 2-7)

Mr. Dahl did

retain that document and it has been submitted for probate.
Mr. Wheadon, decedent, was a man possessed of a great awareness of the need for a will.

(Transcript 3-4, 3-35)

To his close
i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

l

friends he indicated on a number of occasions that his affairs were in
order and that all was taken care of, and that they too should get
their affairs in order.
3-5, Transcript 3-38)

(Transcript 3-3, Transcript 3-4, Transcript
To one of his closest friends, Judy Burton, he

stated several months before his demise that he had a will.
3-2)

(Transcript

The background for that statement was a discussion between the two

of them shortly after Judy's step-father had died intestate, causing
confusion to the surviving members of the family.

(Transcript 2-49, 3-2)

Additionally, on- the way to the hospital a few days prior to
decedent's death, a newscaster on the radio reported the imbroglio surrounding the purported Howard Hughes will.

(Transcript 3-3, 3-4)

Again

on that occasion, decedent told Judy Burton of his awareness of the
importance of a will.

(Transcript 3-4)

To Ray and Joyce Shepard, currently living in Oklahoma,
decedent indicated that he had a will and that his affairs were in
order.

(Record 230)
A day or two after decedent's death, Bertha Tilbury and John

Wheadon, along with Bertha's daughter, Helen Somer, asked Ray and Joyce
Shepard (decedent's next-door neighbors, with whom he had left his keys)
for the keys to the decedent's house for the purpose of obtaining a suit
in which to bury decedent.

(Transcript 3-62)

At the time, Grant Palmer,

a friend of the Shepards, was visiting at their house.

(Record 227)

By affidavit, the Shepards stated that Bertha, John and Helen
went to the house in company with Ray and Joyce Shepard and Grant Palmer.
(Record 230-231)

Once inside, Bertha and Helen went directly to the
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cupboard where decedent was known to have kept some of his personal
papers.

The Shepards did not see what documents Bertha

(Record 230-231)

I

I

and Helen were handling.
were taken.

Nor did the Sh.epards see what documents, if any,

Since the Shepards and Grant Palmer had gone to the house

to get the Shepards' fish tanks and guns, those three left as soon as
they had obtained their personal property.

(Record 227, 230-231)

Grant Palmer, by affidavit, a copy of which is included in
the record, stated under oath that by the time he and the Shepards
arrived at decedent's home, John, Bertha and Helen were already inside.
(Record 227)

He observed that by the time he arrived, Bertha and

Helen had taken decedent's personal papers from the cupboard, had
them on the kitchen table, and were looking through them.
227)

(Record

When he and the Shepards left with the guns and fish tanks, the

others remained behind.

(Record 227)

Mr. Palmer did not see any of

the three outside the home until some 30 minutes later, when he observed Bertha come from the direction of the decedent's home and
enter her own home.

(Record 227)

Contrary to the affidavits of disinterested parties, Bertha
testified at trial that she was not in the home at any time when the
Shepards and Mr. Palmer were not present.
Record 227)

(Transcript 3-71, 3-72,

She also testified that she did not handle the papers and

documents in the cupboard.

(Transcript 3-71, 3-72)

Helen also testified that she was not in the house at any
time when the Shepards and Mr. Palmer were not present.

(Transcript
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3-76)

Initially she also testified that she had never handled any of

the documents or even opened the cupboard.

However, upon being pressed

on the matter, she finally admitted that the cupboard had been opened,
but added,

11

Just a 1ittl e.

11

(Transcript 3-76)

Despite the testimony of Bertha and Helen, John testified that
he was never in the house at the time in question.

(Transcript 3-63)

His testimony is also contradicted by that of Mr. Palmer and Mr. and
Mrs. Shepard.

(Record 227)

It was petitioners' intention to have Ray and Joyce Shepard
testify at the trial; they had indicated that they would.

Petitioners

were providing the Shepards with plane tickets to Salt Lake City, Utah,
and were making hotel accommodations for their stay--all at petitioners'
expense.

Because the Shepards lived in Oklahoma, they were beyond the

subpoena powers of the Court.

Despite that fact, as noted, the Shepards

had agreed to voluntarily come to testify.

However, within a matter of

days, including a weekend, before the trial, the Shepards wavered in
their willingness to testify, until finally just before trial, they
refused to make an appearance.

This was due to the illness of Mrs.

Shepard at the time of trial and the fact that her brother-in-law had
become critically ill.
Because of preparation for the trial, including drafting of
petitioners' trial memorandum and jury instructions, and further preparation of petitioners' case-in-chief, petitioners' attorneys did not
locate Grant Palmer for the purpose of finding out what he knew about
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the incident.

Petitioners' attorneys had never contacted Grant Palmer

prior to trial, and his connection with the case seemed peripheral at
best.

It was only when the Shepards failed to appear and Bertha and

Helen testified inconsistently as to the incident, that the importance
of Mr. Palmer's knowledge became more apparent.
Objectors Tilbury and Wheadon were granted nothing by the will
and thus would receive no property if the will were probated.

If the

decedent were found to have died intestate, they would each receive onefourth of the estate.
At the close of petitioners' case-in-chief, both petitioners
and objectors Tilbury and Wheadon moved for a directed verdict.

motions were denied.

Both

(Transcript 3-41, 3-55)

At the conclusion of objectors' case, both petitioners and
objectors moved again for a directed verdict.
Petitioners' motion was denied.

(Transcript 3-78, 79)

(Transcript 3-79)

Objectors' motion

was granted on the ground that, as used in Section 75-3-26, U.C.A., the
phrase "in existence" means actual, physical existence of the paper.
(Transcript 3-80)

While it was never proved that the will was not in

actual physical existence, the Court held that the will's physical
existence at the moment of the testator's death must be proved, and
since it could not be proved it was not in physical existence at the
pertinent moment, and thus the will was not entitled to be probated.

-7-
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ARGUMENT
The law in effect at the time of the decedent's death, and
therefore the law which governs this case is contained in Section 75-326, Utah Code Annotated.

That section provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the
same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death
of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly
and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. (Emphasis
added.)
It is petitioners'-appellants' contention that ''in existence",
as used in this section, simply means legal existence, i.e., unrevoked.
On the other hand, objectors-respondents claim that ''in existence" means
actual physical existence.

While no Utah case has decided the issue,

the judge at the trial indicated that most courts had interpreted the
phrase to mean actual physical existence.

Even though the will has

never been shown not to exist, the trial court held that since its
physical existence at the moment of testator's death was not shown, the
will was inadmissible to probate.

Petitioners-appellants contend that

such a construction was erroneous, that legal existence is all that is
required to carry out the purpose and intent of the statutes, and therefore they are entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

POINT I.
THAT LEGAL EXISTENCE IS SUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CASE LAW TO
SATISFY THE INTENT OF SECTION 75-3-36, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
While not dealing specifically with the issue of legal
~physical

~ ~

existence, the only Utah case dealing with Section 75-3-26,
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U.C.A. is In re Frandsen's Will, 50 Utah 156, 167 P. 362 (1917).
that case, the testatrix had executed a will in 1900.
other wills later:

One in 1911 and another in 1912.

In

She executed two
The latter two

wills had been executed at a time when the testatrix was found to lack
sufficient mental capacity, and therefore they were denied probate.

The

case then involved only the admissibility to probate of the will of
1900.

That will had been duly executed and was recorded in the County

Clerk's office.
insane.

On July 5, 1911, testatrix was found and declared

to~

The will was last seen in March, 1912--some three years prior

to her death in 1915.

The court faced the issue then of whether or not

the will was in existence at testatrix' death.

But rather than decide

what "in existence" meant, the court based its decision on what "death"
meant.

In construing the statute, the court stated as the section's

purpose,

. to prevent spurious wil 1s from being proved."

supra at 364.

Frandsen, ,

And further:

[I]f the whole purpose of the statute can be subserved, the court
in furtherance of justice, may well give its provisions a fair and
even a liberal construction rather than a narrow and strict one,
when to do that would be unfair and unjust. (Frandsen, supra at
364.)
The court then proceeded to give the term "death" as used in
the statute, a fair and reasonable interpretation.

Rather than hold

that "death" meant physical death, the court held that "death" meant
legal or mental death, that is, loss of sufficient mental capacity
either to make or revoke a will.
While she [testatrix] continued to live physically, she, however,
was as much dead mentally for the purpose of making a will as she
now is . . . When it is once shown that a testator is bereft of
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the power either to change or to revoke an existing will, it is
further shown, as here, that the will existed long after the power
to revoke passed from the testator, then such a will fairly comes
within the provisions of Section [75-3-26] and should be admitted
to probate the same as though the testator had physically died.
(Frandsen, supra at 365.)
The court thus drew a distinction between physical and legal
death in order to reach a fair and just result.

In the instant case,

where it was conclusively shown that the will was unrevoked and therefore in legal existence, there is ample reason to comply with the mandate
of the Frandsen decision, by construing the section liberally and
fairly, and hold that legal existence sufficiently subserves the purpose
of the section.

To hold, as the trial court held, in limiting the

statute to require physical existence, is to construe the statute
narrowly and strictly with an unfair and unjust result.

POINT II.
THAT A REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE CONTRADICTS THE
CLEAR INTENT OF SECTION 74-1-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
The Code is explicit on the ways in which wills may be revoked.
And by the very language of the statute, the ways prescribed thereunder
are exclusive.

Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. states:

Except in cases in this chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any
part thereof, can be revoked or altered otherwise than:
(1) By a written will or other writing of the testator declaring such revocation or alteration executed with the same
formalities with which a will should be executed by such testator;
or

(2) By being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the same,
by the testator himself, or by some person in his presence and by
his direction.
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As seen from the language of that section, there are two
physical ways of revoking a will:

(1)

By making a second will and (2)

by destroying the will with the intent and purpose of revoking the same.
The other ways provided by "except in the cases in this chapter mentioned"
are by operation of law.

Section 74-1-24, 1 U.C.A. provides for the

revocation of a will in the case where the testator marries and has
children after having executed a will.

Section 74-1-25,2 U.C.A. pro-

vides for the revocation of a testator's will where the testator marries
after making his will.

Section 74-1-31,3 U.C.A. provides for the revo-

74-1-24. Effect of marriage and issue after making will. If after
making a will the testator marries and has issue of such marriage born
either in his lifetime or after his death, and the wife or issue survives
him, the will is conclusively presumed to be revoked, unless provision
is made for such issue by some settlement, or unless such issue is provided for in the will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show an
intention not to make such provision; and no evidence of other facts to
rebut the presumption of such revocation can be received.
2 74-1-25. Effect of marriage, if wife survives. If after making a
will the testator marries and the wife survives him, the will is conclusively presumed to be revoked, unless provision has been made for her
either by marriage contract, or by some written settlement showing on
its face the testator's intention to substitute such contract or settlement for a provision in her favor in his will, or unless she is provided
for in the will or in such way mention therein as to show an intention
not to make such provision; and no evidence of other facts to rebut the
presumption of revocation can be received.
3 74-1-31. Child born after making will. Whenever a testator has a
child born either in his lifetime or after his death, or adopted, after
the making of his will, and dies leaving such child unprovided for by
any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way mentioned in
his will, the child succeeds to the same portion of the testator's real
and personal property that he would have succeeded to if the testator
had died intestate.
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cation, pro tanto, of a will in the case where a child is born to the
testator after execution of the will.

Section 74-1-32, 4 U.C.A. provides

for the revocation of a will in the case of a pretermitted heir.

As

noted, the four exceptions to Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. are all by operation of law. -The legal statutory scheme then for revocation of wills is
clear:

Unless the will is revoked by operation of law, a will may be

revoked only by a subsequent will, or by destruction with intent to
revoke.

Loss of a will clearly does not revoke the will under Utah law.
Except in the operation-of-law cases, two elements must be

shown to prove an effective revocation:

(1)

A physical act--either

making a new will or destroying the old one; and (2) intent to revoke.
In the case of a subsequent will, the act and intent are apparent from
the will itself.

In the case of a destroyed will, however, mere des-

truction does not necessarily evince an intent to revoke.

If the will

is accidentally or mistakenly destroyed, since there is no intent, there
is no revocation; for under Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. the intent element
is explicit and essential.
revoking the same."

"With the intent and for the purpose of

(Emphasis added.)

intent, there is no revocation.

Thus, absent the requisite

Loss of a will may create a presumption

of revocation, but such presumption is clearly overcome by contrary
statements from the testator.

4 74-1-32. Failure to provide for child or child's issue. When any
testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, natural
or adopted, or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it appears
that such omission was intentional, such child or the issue of such
child has the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had
died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceeding
section.
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What is the effect of Section 75-3-26, U.C.A. upon statutory
scheme outlining the exclusive means for revocation of a will?

Section

75-3-26, U.C.A. requires that the will must be shown to be "in existence"
at the testator's death.

If the will were accidentally or mistakenly

destroyed by testator during his lifetime, but without the intent to
revoke, under Section 75-1-19, U.C.A. it is still a valid will and has
not been revoked, and should be legally operative.

But if "in existence"

means physical existence, since the paper is no longer in existence, the
will cannot be probated.

Thus, the result is that an unrevoked will,

one which disposes of the testator's property as he wanted and intended,
and one which he intended to be effective as a will, cannot be probated.
Such a result abrogates the intent of the testator and is, thus, absurd,
unfair, unjust, and it does not subserve the purpose of the statute as
outlined in Frandsen, and also contradicts the liberal construction
demanded by Frandsen.
The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Fox Will, 174 N.E.2d
499 (N.Y. 1961), construed their lost will statute which is almost
identical to Utah's.
destroyed.

In that case, the will had actually been physically

1

Later the testator, on learning of its destruction, "orally

adopted" the destruction.

The court stated:

However sophisticated the reasoning may appear, to speak of a
destroyed will which is valid and unrevoked but which may not be
admitted to probate is legal sophistry unless the refusal to admit
it is based on reasonable doubt as to whether the will was really
the testator's will . . . Here, there is no doubt whatsoever that
the will offered for probate was the testator's will. Nor is the~
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any question that it was not revoked with the formality required by
law. There is, under these circumstances, no reason for denyin
it probate.
Fox, supra at 505 emphasis added
In the instant case, there was no evidence presented at trial
that the will was destroyed; objectors and respondents relied totally
upon an inference of destruction, since the will could not be found.
This apparent conflict between the two Code sections is obviated by
construing "in existence" to mean legal existence.

The result is that

since there is no intent to revoke, there is no revocation, the will
continues to exist legally, fairly fits within the ambit of Section 753-26, U.C.A. and thus is admissible to probate.

The evidence adduced at

trial showed indisputably that the testator had no intent to revoke his
will.

He told Lawrence Leak that he, Howard L. Wheadon, had his affairs

in order and that Mr. Leak should get his affairs in order.

Decedent

told Darlene Oakeson shortly before his death that his affairs were in
order.

To Judy Burton, decedent on at least two occasions, said he had

a will and that his affairs were in order.
The statements to Judy Burton and Darlene Oakeson all occurred
in the context of a discussion about someone who had died not having his
affairs in order, i.e., dying intestate.

When Darlene's step-father-in-

law had died intestate, the family was left in a state of uncertainty
and confusion.

When decedent and Darlene talked about the situation,

decedent then indicated he had his affairs in order.
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The first time decedent told Judy Burton he had a will was
about the same time he had the above discussion with Darlene.

Decedent

and Judy were talking about the death of Judy's step-father who had died
intestate.

At that time, Judy asked him directly whether he had a will.

Emphatically, decedent said he did.
The other occasion occurred when a radio newscaster reported
the dispute surrounding Howard Hughes' estate.

Again decedent indicated

to Judy that he had a will.
As was shown at trial, the decedent was acutely aware of the
importance of having a will.
of his will.

And he was very much aware of the contents

Within 15 days of the death of his appointed executor,

decedent executed a codicil changing the executor of his estate.
In contrast, there was not a scintilla of evidence indicating
a desire on the part of decedent to revoke or modify his will.

Never

did decedent express dissatisfaction with the will or its provisions.
From the date it was written in 1955, until 1971, the will remained
unchanged.

Only when the executor died was the will changed, and that

change was solely to replace executors.

The fact that decedent went

back to his lawyer to effect the change indicates that he felt the need
for legal assistance when dealing with changes in his testamentary
plans.

There was no evidence that he ever consulted an attorney to

change his beneficiary or revoke his will.
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POINT III.
THAT A REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE TURNS THE
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION INTO A CONCLUSIVE
PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION.
The general rule is that where a will was last known to be in
testator's possession, and cannot be found after his death, the will is
presumed to have been destroyed with the intent to revoke.

Garrett

v. Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 1958); In re Fox Will, 174 N.E.2d 499
(N.Y. 1961); In re Morgan Estate, 59 N.E.2d 800.

But it has just as

uniformly been held that the presumption is rebuttable.

In re Frandsen's

Will, 176 P. 362, 365 (1917); Garrett v. Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark.
1958); In re Findley's Estate, 93 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1939); Hoff v.
Armbruster, 226 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1950).
If, however, Section 75-3-26 is construed to require "physical
existence", then while the presumption may be rebutted, the will still
cannot be probated because the paper may no longer be in existence.
upshot is that the rebuttable presumption becomes conclusive.

The

Such

a result is unfair and unjust, and would entirely thwart the desires and
intentions of the testator.

Frandsen clearly holds that the purpose of

the lost will statute is to avoid this result.
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POINT IV.
THAT MERE FAILURE TO LOCATE A WILL DOES NOT MEAN THAT
THE TESTATOR DESTROYED THE WILL WITH THE INTENT TO REVOKE.
Just because the will has not been found, doesn't mean it
has been destroyed.

As noted, subsequent to testator's death, a dili-

gent but unfruitful search was made of the house and his safe deposit
box, with the result that only a copy of his codicil was found in his
safe deposit box.

Also, decedent's attorney, Everett Dahl, made an

exhaustive search through his own files, but found only the original
codicil and a conformed copy of the will.

On the day of the trial,

Everett Dahl, checking through his files one final time to insure that
he did not have the will, found the third copy of the v1ill--the copy
that Dahl would normally have given to the testator to retain.

Dahl

could not explain why he had that copy, nor why he had not been able to
locate it earlier.
At trial it was shown that Mr. Dahl could not locate the
original will.

This, however, does not establish that he did not

keep it in 1955 or that it had not been in his possession.

The in-

ference that Mr. Dahl had the will is strengthened by the fact that
after testator executed the codicil, he insisted that Mr. Dahl retain
the original copy of that document .. Testator may have asked Mr. Dahl to
keep the original will just as he asked him to keep the original
codicil.
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The only evidence which even intimates that the testator had
the original will are:

(l) Dahl's practice at the time to give the

original will to the testator, and (2) the inventory sheet showing that
Dahl didn't have the original.

With respect to number (1), Dahl also

stated he would have retained the original had he been asked.

Decedent

asked him to keep the original codicil, just as he may have asked him to
keep the original will.

With respect to the inventory, it was taken

nine years after the will was executed.

Within that nine-year period,

the will may well have been misplaced or lost.

In that case, testator

never had the document and there is no presumption of revocation.
the will

~

in existence; it just cannot be found.

Thus,

In In re Morgan's Estate,

59 N.E.2d 800 (Ill. 1945), the will could not be found, but the evidence
indicated testator had not revoked it.

The court, at p. 801, said:

[I]t is not necessary that the court be able to determine what
happened to a will if there is evidence that indicates it was not
revoked or cancelled by the testator.
In In re Auritt's Estate, 27 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1933), the will could not
be located, but as here, the evidence showed that the will had not been
revoked.

At p. 716, the court said:

From a reading of the record, we can come to no other conclusion
than that arrived at by the trial court, namely, that Rosa Auritt
never revoked her will, but that it was in existence, somewhere, at
the time of her death. (Emphasis added.)
In In re Moramarco's Estate, 184 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1948), the will was not
found, but it was found to be unrevoked.

The California Supreme Court

said at p. 746:
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If there is no evidence pointing toward destruction of the will,
other than the presumption previously mentioned, and there is
circumstantial evidence of substance tending to prove that it was
not destroyed, we are satisfied that the court may properly find
that it was in existence at the testator's death. Certainly,
we may not hold, as a matter of law, that proof that a will cannot
be found is also proof that it has been destroyed. (Emphasis
added. )
Finally, in In re Hoffman's Estate, 290 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1955),
on facts similar to those in the instant case, the court held at p. 673:
It is not known what happened to the original, executed drafts of
the will and first codicil, but the record affords substantial
evidence in support of the trial court's finding "that said 1~ill
and first codicil were in existence at the time of decedent's death
and have either not been found or have been lost or destroyed by
some person other than decedent".
All the evidence introduced at trial shows that decedent did
not revoke his will.

Evidence that it cannot be found, which formed the

entire basis of objectors' and respondents' case, does not prove that it
is not in existence or that it was revoked.
As additional evidence showing that the Will was in existence
at the time of decedent's death, and explaining why it has not been
found, is the fact that Bertha and Helen rifled through the documents in
the cupboard.

Besides the two brothers, one of whom was in the house

with Bertha and Helen, they were the only ones who had a motive for
wanting the will destroyed.

Spending as much time as they did at a

place in the house where the decedent was known to have kept some of his
papers and documents, afforded them ample opportunity to find and confiscate the will.
Also, when asked at trial about the above incident, both Helen
and Bertha were very equivocal and evasive, and even contradictory in
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recounting what actually occurred.

Such suspicious circumstances

indicate that some impropriety may well have occurred.

Therefore,

pursuant to the above-cited cases, the court should have found that
the will was in existence at testator's death and either that it just
has not been found, or that it was destroyed subsequent to testator's
death by parties interested in the decedent's intestacy.

POINT V.
THAT THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
WITH SIMILAR STATUTES HOLDS THAT LEGAL EXISTENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SATISFY THE INTENT OF THIS KIND OF STATUTE.
The statute, Section 75-3-26, U.C.A., requires a will to be
"in existence at the time of the death of the testator" to be admitted
to probate.

The court found that the section requires that the physical

existence of the document at the time of death be shown, and since in
this case the will has not been found, it was therefore not in existence.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the paper has been destroyed, a fact
unsupported by any evidence, petitioners and appellants contend that the
purpose of the section is fulfilled only if the section is construed to
require legal existence; that is, that it be unrevoked by the testator.
Proof of non-revocation is all that should be required; for as was
said in Frandsen, supra, at p. 363:

"The purpose of the statute is to

prevent spurious wills from being proved."

Once non-revocation is

shown, there is no reason not to probate the will, even though the
original document is lost.

Where there is no question that the will

being offered for probate is genuine, and "[I]f the whole purpose of
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the statute can be subserved, the court, in furtherance of justice, may
well give its provisions a fair and even a liberal construction rather
than a narrow and strict one, when to do that would be unfair or unjust.'
Frandsen, supra at 364.

The court proceeded to follow its own counsel

holding that, as used in the statute, "death" meant "legal death for
purposes of making a will" and not "physical death".

There is no reason

to strictly construe the term "in existence" as the trial court did in
this case, when to do so would circumvent the stated and proven intention
of the testator in an unfair and unjust manner.
The only possible reason for requiring that the paper's physica1
existence be shown is to prevent fraud.

The terms of the will can just

as easily be proved by an exact copy as by the original copy itself.
Where the will is unrevoked, a copy shows the testator's intent just as
readily as the missing original.

And if testator's intent is clearly

shown, and it is clearly shown that he did not revoke the will, there
is no fraud.

Thus, no reason exists to exclude the unrevoked will (see

In re Fox' Will, 174 N.E.2d 499, 505 (N.Y. 1961 }).
On the other hand, to deny probate to an unrevoked though
~issing

will, would totally frustrate the intent of the testator.

It

would also deny him the right to dispose of his property as he deemed
best.
At the trial, the court required that the will's physical
existence be shown.

However, a reading of the cases of other j uri sdi ctio~ i

reveals that by far, the most common construction of "in existence" is
legal and not physical existence.
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Listed in alphabetical order, the construction of similar
statutes in other jurisdictions is as follows:

ARKANSAS.
Arkansas Statutes Sec. 60-304 requires that the will be shown
to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator."
In construing the statute, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Garrett v.
Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 1958) noted that even though the will could
not be found, nothing had changed to alter the disposition of the
property as provided by the wi 11.

Al so, there was ". . . a total

absence of any testimony he tried or wanted to make any change in or
revoke his will."

The court then stated:

The vital question with which we are concerned of course is
whether or not the will was revoked. We are confronted with no
proof but with a presumption only that it was revoked. We think
the testimony and attending circumstances are sufficient to
overcome that presumption. Garrett, supra at 285 (emphasis
added).
The unrevoked though missing will was thus admitted to probate.

CALIFORNIA
California's Probate Code Section 350 is almost identical to
Utah's Section.

In interpreting their section, the intermediate appellate

courts of California have gone both ways.
However, the Supreme Court in deciding two cases has held
that legal existence is all that is required.
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In In re Moramarco's Estate, 194 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1948) the
evidence adduced at trial showed only that the will could not be found.
If there is no evidence pointing toward destruction of the will,
other than the presumption previously mentioned, and there is
circumstantial evidence of substance tending to prove that it
was not destroyed, we are satisfied that the court may properly
find that it was in existence at the date of testator's death.
The only other California Supreme Court case in point, In re
Bristol's Estate, 143 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1943) held "existence" to mean
"unrevoked".

In that case, it was proved that the will had been duly

executed, but had never been seen by anyone after testator's death.
The only evidence showing revocation was the presumption of revocation,
based on the fact that the will could not be found.

The Supreme Court,

after citing testimony from the trial, stated:
The above-quoted testimony obviously depicts a state of mind of
the testator which the trial judge could well have concluded
was consistent only with the lost codicil's being, in [testator's]
belief, unrevoked and potentially operative. Bristol, supra at
693 (emphasis added).
Of the three California appeallate court decisions on the
subject, one has held that legal existence was sufficient, while two
have held that physical existence was necessary.
In In re Flood's Estate, 119 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1941), the will
could not be shown to exist after the death of the decedent.

Nor was

there any evidence rebutting the presumption of revocation.

The court

posed the question it would have to answer as " . . . whether there is
sufficient evidence in the record to justify a finding that the will was
lost, and that it was in existence at the time of death.

This may sound

contradictory, but it is obvious the words 'in existence' import 'unrEv0~-
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Flood, supra at 169 (emphasis added).

Finding there was insufficient

evidence to overcome the presumption of revocation, the court held that
the presumption prevailed and that the will had been revoked.

It was on

that ground that the will was denied probate and not that the paper was
no longer in physical existence.
The two cases holding that physical existence is required are
In re Estate of Strickman, 55 Cal.Rptr. 606 (1966) and In re Estate of
Lane, 86 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1970).

In the Strickman case, the testatrix had

told a friend that she wanted to change a number of provisions on page
three of her will.
paper.

The friend typed the changes on another piece of

At the testatrix' death, the first two pages of the original

will, along with the newly typed, but unexecuted, third page, were found
together in the testatrix' safe deposit box.

Since the original third

page could not be found, the presumption of revocation arose.

However,

in that case, no evidence was offered to rebut the presumption of
revocation.

From the evidence it was clear that the intent of the

testatrix was to revoke that portion of her will.

The court held, and

rightfully so, that because the third page was no longer in physical
existence and was not where it should have been, it had been revoked.
But it is also important to note that in that case, the testatrix had
expressed dissatisfaction with the provisions of the will and had
actually had a friend type a new page.

In the instant case, the testator

never expressed any dissatisfaction with the disposition of his estate.
Only when his brother died did he change the executors.

Additionally,

in Strickman there was no evidence overcoming the presumption of
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revocation; whereas, in the instant case, it was conclusively shown
that the testator had no intent to revoke his will, and therefore there
was no revocation.

Thus, the court in Strickman was not faced with

the circumstances present in this case, and therefore its holding and
rationale do not apply to this case.
In In re Estate of Lane, 86 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1970), the second
California case requiring physical existence, the question was not one
of physical versus legal existence.

Rather, it was a question of

standing to contest the probate of a subsequent will.

In order to show

that standing, the contestant had to show the will was "in existence"
at the testator's death and that they were takers under the will.
Since there had been no evidence introduced showing the will was in
existence, either legal or physical, the court concluded that the
contestant had no standing.

In its discussion of the meaning of

existence, the court stated:
The word "Existence" used in the code section means "physical
existence" rather than "legal existence". Lane, supra at 622.
As authority for its holding, the court relied on the following

1

I

decisions:
(1)

Strickman, supra.

See above discussion.

{2)

In Estate of Kidder, 6 P. 326 (Cal. 1885) the evidence

showed that the testatrix had actually destroyed the will herself by
throwing it into the fire.

There was no evidence showing she did not
I

intend to revoke it.

Thus, while the will was not in physical existence, I
I

it was also not in legal existence.

Its probate was thus properly denied i

under either interpretation.
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(3)

In Estate of Johnson, 66 P. 845 (Cal. 1901) the evidence

showed that the testator intentionally destroyed the will, thinking
that a subsequent will would be sufficient, when in fact it was not.
Since testator had destroyed his will with the intent to revoke, the
will was not in legal or physical existence.
(4)

Finally, in Estate of Patterson, 102 P. 941 (Cal. 1909)

the will in question was in testator's house when it burned down.
testator had time to execute a new will, but failed to do so.

The

The court

denied probate on the ground that the will was not in physical existence
at the testator's death.

An important fact supporting that result is

that the testator, while having the opportunity to execute a new will,
never did so.

The court thusly denied probate.

In all the above cases, it is important to note that the
will had actually been physically destroyed and in most cases by the
testator or testatrix.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that

the will was actually destroyed; there is merely an inference that it
might have been.

Also, there is substantial evidence that testator

never intended to revoke his will, thus rebutting the presumption of
revocation.

In the above cases no evidence was introduced rebutting the

presumption of revocation.

It is apparent, therefore, that the

California cases requiring physical existence are inapplicable to the
instant case.

On the other hand, the facts of Moramarco are on all

fours with the facts of the instant case, and would be controlling if
this case were brought in California.
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COLORADO
Colorado's lost will statute was formerly Sec. 5205.
the section number was changed to Sec. 152-5-29.

In 1953,

In 1973, the codes

were revised and apparently the lost will section was deleted.

As it

stood prior to deletion, the section was substantially the same as Utah's.
The first case dealing with the section was In re Eder's
29 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1933).

Esta~.

No evidence showed the physical existence of

the paper subsequent to the testator's death.
that the will had been revoked.

There was also no evidence

In construing the term "in existence"

the court said:
A will must be reduced to writing (citing the applicable code
section) but its continued existence as a will should not be held
to depend at all events upon the production and exhibition of the
writing . . . [A] will, once validly made and published, remains
a will, although the writing, the best evidence of it, in the
absence of intent to revoke, be lost or destroyed. Thus considered, the word "existence" in our statute has to do with the
will of the testator as manifested by his intent that the terms
of the writing shall be carried out on his death. Eder, supra
at 634 (emphasis added).
The most recent Colorado decision on the issue in question
is In re Estate of Enz, 515 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1973) where following
decedent's death, the original will was not found.

In holding declara-

tions of the decedent admissible to show non-revocation of the will,
the court stated:
However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence of decedent's
declaration tending to prove decedent believed the will to be in
existence unrevoked. Enz, supra at ll36, 1137 (emphasis added).
Finally, In re Varnum's Estate, 357 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1960)
dealt with Colorado's lost will statute.

While it was not shown whether '
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or not the will was revoked, the basis for the court's holding was not
the non-existence of the will, but rather because the terms of the
document could not be adequately proved.
which the court emphasized in italics.

This is clear from the words
Additionally, the court cited

Eder, supra as authority and in no way indicated disapproval with Eder's
holding.

Also, subsequent to Varnum in the Enz decision, the court

equated "in existence" with non-revocation.

Indisputably, then, the

Colorado position is in line with the great weight of authority, to-wit,
proof of non-revocation proves existence.

IDAHO
Prior to 1971 when the lost will section was repealed, Idaho's
lost will statute was the same as Utah's and was contained in Idaho
Code Sec. 15-231.

Three cases were decided under that section, only

one of which was concerned with whether the will was "in existence"
at the time of the testator's death.

That case, In re Kilgore's Estate,

387 P.2d 16 (Id. 1963) made two trips to the Supreme Court.

The first

was in 1962 (see 370 P.2d 512) when the main issue litigated was the
competency of a beneficiary to testify to the contents of the will.
Holding such a witness competent, the Supreme Court sent the case back
to the trial court for retrial.

After the second trial, the case went

back to the Supreme Court (Kilgore, 387 P.2d 16).

The question posed

by the trial court setting forth the requirements of the code section
were:
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1.
Was the will in question revoked by [decedent] prior
to his death?
2.
If the will was not revoked, have the contents been
proved as provided by law? Kilgore, supra at 16.
Finding that there had not been sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
finding on the first question, i.e., revocation, the court remanded
stating:

"The case is remanded for a new trial limited to the question

of revocation."

Kilgore, supra at 21 (emphasis added).

As is apparent from a reading of the Kilgore case, Idaho's
definition of "in existence" is legal existence, i.e., whether or not
the will has been revoked.

ILLINOIS
Illinois does not have a lost will statute.

However, the

Supreme Court was faced with a case where the physical existence of the
will could not be shown in In re Morgan's Estate, 59 N.E. 800, 801
(Ill. 1945).

The court held that:

The test applied in the cases which have been before this court,
is whether the evidence shows that it is unlikely that the testator destroyed his will. To determine this, evidence of the
statements made by the testator a short time before his death
is competent. As was held in Matter of Page, 8 N.E. 852 (Ill. 1886),,
it is not necessary that the court be able to determine what
happened to a will if there is evidence that indicates it was
not revoked or cancelled by the testator. (Emphasis added.)

INDIANA
Indiana's lost will statute is contained in Sec. 29-1-7-5.
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 115 N.E. 582 (Ind. 1917), one of the few cases
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The "continued existence of the will" does not mean its continued
physical existence. A will may continue to exist though the
paper it was written upon is destroyed.

MINNESOTA
Initially, Minnesota's lost will statute was the same as Utah's.
Under that section, the leading case the court decided was In re Havel's
Estate, 194 N.\oi. 633 (Minn. 1923).

The will was not shown to be in

physical existence at the time of the testator's death.
the question as follows:

The court posed

"Does this section require physical existence

of the document at the moment of the testator's death; or is existence
in contemplation of law, without the coexistence of the paper and writing
all that is demanded?"

The court answered the question thusly:

The section

" . . . is construed not to require physical existence of the will at
the time of the testator's death in order to permit its probate, in the
manner indicated, as a lost or destroyed will.
unrevoked is all that is required."

Its continued legal effect,

Havel's Estate, supra at 634 {emphasis

added).
Recognizing that injustice had often resulted from some courts
requiring physical existence, the legislature changed the statute to
provide in pertinent part that no lost will ".

shall be established

unless it is proved to have remained unrevoked

M.S.A. Sec.

525.261.
Minnesota, in 1975, changed its entire probate code and deleted
the code section altogether.

Thus, there is no lost will statute today

in Minnesota.
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decided under the statute, the Supreme Court did not decide whether
physical or legal existence would be required.

The court simply said,

"The record would have to show that the trial court found as a fact that
the alleged will was in existence at the time of the death of the
testator."

Fl etcher, supra at 583.

meant by "in existence".

But the court did not say what it

No other case from Indiana has been reported

which bears on the issue involved herein.

KANSAS
The Kansas statute, Sec. 59-2228, while not using the term
"in existence", requires that the original will be shown to have been
lost after the death of the testator.

In Chruchill v. Dill, 68 P.2d 337

(Kan. 1937) it could not be shown that the will was not lost before the
testator's death; there was no evidence as to when it was lost.

The

court held that legal existence at the testator's death was sufficient.
"The question tried in this case was whether the will was in existence,
or in force, at the time of the death of the testator."
supra at 340.

Churchill,

The trial court found that the will was in force at the

time of testator's death, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
legal existence was sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the statute.

MAINE

The Main statute, Sec. 18-103, requires the "continued existencE
of the will.

In Appeal of Thompson, 96 A. 238, 239 (Me. 1915) the

Supreme Judicial Court said:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-30-

MONTANA
In 1904, Montana's lost will section read the same as Utah's.
In re Colbert's Estate, 78 P. 871 (Mont. 1904) the Supreme Court, in
construing the statute said:
[T]he statute is to the effect that the proponent of a lost will
must prove either that the will was actually in existence at the
time of the testator's death, or that it is in existence in
contemplation of law. If it was fraudulently destroyed in his
lifetime it is still so in existence. If appellant cannot prove
that the will was in existence, either actually or in contemplation
of the law, at the time [decedent] died, it follows that his case
cannot stand. Colbert, supra at 974 (emphasis added).
Finding, however, that the presumption of revocation was not overcome,
the court denied probate.

It is patently clear that had such presumption

been overcome, the will would have been in existence "in contemplation
of law" and that the court would have admitted it to probate.
In 1947, the Montana Codes were re.vised with the concomitant
renumbering of the section, but its provisions remained identical.

The

Supreme Court, in 1974, had occasion to deal with the section in a case
factually similar to the Colbert case, supra.

As in the Colbert case,

the proponent failed to rebut the presumption of revocation.

With

respect to the existence of the will, the court said that the test was
the will was actually in existence or in existence in

whether "

contemplation of the law at the time of deceased's death."
Estate of Newman, 518 P.2d 800 at 804 (Mont. 1974).

In re

Finding the

presumption of revocation not overcome, the court found the will not
in physical or legal existence, and thus denied probate.
In 1975, the Montana Probate Code was revised, and the lost
will section was deleted.

No new section was adopted which deals with

lost wills.
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NEVADA
Nevada's Section 136.2402(3) is identical to Utah's lost will
section.

It has, however, not been construed by the Nevada courts.

NEW YORK
Prior to 1966, New York's Surrogate's Court Act Sec. 134
was identical to Utah's Section 75-3-26.

After vacillating from

requiring physical existence in Matter of Kennedy's Will, 60 N.E. 442
(N.Y. 1901) to requiring legal existence in Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y.
653, the court of appeals, in In re Fox' Will, 174 N.E.2d 499 (N.Y. 1961)
explicitly held that legal existence was sufficient to meet the requirements of the law.

In that case, the decedent's will had been in Germany

and was destroyed in a bombing raid during World War II.

Upon hearing

of the will 's destruction, the testator purportedly "orally adopted"
the destruction.

The court held that such an adoption of destruction

was ineffective because the testator had not complied with the applicable code sections, and also because no intent to revoke had accompanied the destruction.
The court was then faced with the issue of whether the incontrovertibly destroyed will was "in existence" at the testator's
death so as to fit within the ambit of Section 143 of the Surrogate
Court Act.

The court said at page 504:

The purpose of Section 143 is to impose on the proponent of a lost
or destroyed will the burden of overcoming this common-law presumption of proving, that is, that the lost or destroyed will was
not revoked by the testator during his lifetime . . . In other
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words, all that Section 143 requires is proof that the testator
himself had not revoked the lost or destroyed will, proof that
would overcome the common-law presumption of revocation. (Emphasis
added.)
As authority for its holding, the court in Fox cited Schultz,
supra, which held:
"[T]he wi 11 of the testator has never been legally revoked or
cancelled" and that it followed necessarily that the will was
either "in existence at the time of the death of the testator;
or fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator."
In other words, the court in the Schultz case reasoned that the
fact that the will had not been revoked by the testator necessarily
implied compliance with the statutory requirement that the will
either had been in existence at the time of death or had been
"fraudulently destroyed". Fox, supra at 504.
To drive the point home, the court further said:
But, as is clear from an analysis of Section 143 and from a
reading of the Schultz opinion, the design of the section is
solely to require proof that the lost or destroyed will offered
for probate was not destroyed by the testator animo revocandi.
Fox, supra at 505.
-Finally, as was quoted earlier in this brief, the court in Fox
said at page 505:

"However sophisticated the reasoning may appear, to

speak of a destroyed will which is valid and unrevoked but which may not
be admitted to probate is legal sophistry . .
Five years after the Fox decision, the legislature revised
New York's lost will statute to read in pertinent part:
A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate only if
l. It is established that the will has not been revoked .
(S.C.P. Sec. 407).
The change is significant because it removes all doubt as to the purpose of
the statute.

Following the section, in the New York Codes, is the "Practice
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Commentary" by John L. Goldman.

Commenting on the change, Mr. Goldman

states:
The text of S.C.A. Sec. 143 has been changed in the present section
so as to clarify the legislative intent that the sole question to
be resolved by the court is whether the testator did not intend
to revoke his will. (See comments following Sec. 1407, S.C.P.;
emphasis added.)

OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma has a statute substantially the same as Utah's.

No

Oklahoma case construing the section, however, has involved a situation
similar to that of the instant case.

SOUTH DAKOTA
While South Dakota has a section identical to Utah's, it has
not been construed.

WASHINGTON
Washington's current statute, R.C.W. 11.20.070 is, except for
the number, the same as its predecessor, Rev. St. Sec. 1390, which proscritl
a lost or destroyed will from being proved "

unless the same shall

be proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator."

The State Supreme Court has vacillated on the meaning of

"in existence" under the section.
In In re Auritt's Estate, 27 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1933), the will
of the decedent had never been found.

The presumption of revocation

was overcome by proof that her feelings toward the beneficiary remained
constant from the date of execution until the date of death; this was
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shmvn by, among other things, the decedent's dee l ara ti ans prior to
death.

The court, at page 716, said:

From a reading of the record, we can come to no other conclusion
than that arrived at by the trial court, namely, that [the decedent]
never revoked her will, but that it was in existence, somewhere,
at the time of her death. (Emphasis added.)
A careful reading of the underscored language reveals that the
court admitted the will to probate, not on the basis of its physical
existence, but on the basis of its legal existence.

That follows from

the fact that its physical existence could not be shown.

Only its legal

existence, i.e., non-revocation, could be shown and thus its admission
to probate must have been on that ground.
Notwithstanding the above authority, in In re Kerckhof's Estate,
125 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1942), the court was faced with facts substantially
different from those of either the instant case or those of Auritt
decision.

In Kerckhof, supra, the testator directed that his will be
His purpose in doing so was to

torn up and destroyed in his presence.

make certain that the provisions of the will would not be effective.
Thus it is clear that he not only destroyed his will, but also that he
did so with the intent to revoke it.

As such, it was not in physical or

legal existence at the testator's death.

The court based its holding on

the fact that it was not physically in existence.
When [the legislature] said that such will must be proved to have
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, it
meant--just as the language plainly signifies--the physical existence
of the written document. Kerckhof, supra at 287.
As noted, the facts were that the will had been revoked.
Since that is not the situation in the instant case, the holding of that
decision is inapplicable.
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Finally, In re Estate of Nelson, 537 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1975),
the most recent Washington decision, reaffirms the Auritt holding, and
indicates that legal existence is sufficient.

The pertinent facts

showed only that the will had not been revoked--not that it had not been
destroyed.

Said the court at page 769:

The statutory requirement of proof of existence simply codifies the
common-law presumption that a will that cannot be found was destroyed animo revocandi, which may be rebutted by evidence as to the
testator's attitude of mind, as indicated by his declarations made
between the time of executing the will and the time of his death
. . . [citing Auritt, supra]. Recognizing that the fundamental
concern is fulfillment of the testator's intent, we have in previous
cases found evidence showing that a will was in existence at the
time of death adequate, although it was far from ovenvhelmi ng . . .
[W]e hold that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the
will was in existence at the time of [the decedent's] death and was
not destroyed by her with the intent to revoke it." Nelson, supra
at 769, 770.
Even though the physical existence of the will could not be shown, it
was admitted to probate because it was shown that it had not been revoked and therefore in legal existence.
Clearly, then, the Washington construction of the section comports with the position being urged by petitioners.

The only case

indicating otherwise, Kerckhof, supra, is not applicable because of the
above-noted factual distinctions.

WYOMING
Wyoming has a statute similar to that of Utah's, but to date
it has not been construed.
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POINT VI.
THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED WHEN EVIDENCE WHICH COULD
NOT BE PRODUCED AT TRIAL IS NEWLY DISCOVERED.
Pursuant to Rule 59(4), U.R.C.P., a new trial should be
granted when after trial there is " . . . newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the application which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial."

By

affidavit, petitioners-appellants adduced evidence after trial which
would have changed the trial court's holding.

Denying the motion for a

new trial was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
The evidence which is newly discovered is that the objectors
possibly had access to the document which cannot be found.

They were

the only ones who had a motive for wanting the will destroyed.

And

their contradictory testimony at trial, coupled with the above facts,
indicates that a grave injustice may result if a new trial is not
granted.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that those who knew
Harvard L. Wheadon well, knew he kept some of his papers and documents
in a particular cupboard.

The Shepards have stated under oath that

Bertha and Helen went immediately to that cupboard and started rifling
through the documents.

Grant Palmer's affidavit states that Bertha and

Helen were already rifling through those documents when he arrived.

The

slight discrepancy as to time only is not nearly as important as the
fact that both Bertha and Helen went foraging through those documents.
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Of import, also, is the fact that they and the decedent's two brothers
were the only ones who would profit from the loss of the will.

This,

coupled with the fact that Bertha said the cupboard door was never open,
Helen's equivocal and evasive initial statements that no one opened the
cupboard, and then finally admitting that it was opened "just a little",
and John's denial that he was ever there prior to the funeral, points
the finger of suspicion in the direction of the objectors-respondents.
Especially is this so in light of the disinterested testimony of Grant
Palmer and the Shepards, wholly contradicting Bertha's, Helen's and
John's testimony, and indicating that Bertha and Helen spent a substantial amount of time looking through documents which had come from a
cupboard, which obviously was much more than "just a little" open.
Furthermore, as Grant Palmer stated under oath, none of the
three interested parties, John, Bertha or Helen, was seen outside the
house until nearly a half hour later, when he observed Bertha enter her
home from the direction of the decedent's home.
As noted previously, the attorneys for petitioners-appellants
would have been able to present this evidence at the previous trial,
except that only at the last minute did the Shepards back down from
their willingness to testify.
,Because of the paucity of time, petitioners' attorneys could
not, by reasonable diligence, have obtained similar testimony from Grant
Palmer.

Petitioners' attorneys had never been in contact with Mr.

Palmer.

They had learned of his presence on the occasion in question
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before the trial; but at that time, the Shepards were still expected to
testify.

By the time the Shepards had completely backed out, petitioners'

attorneys were so engrossed in the final preparation of their case-inchief, that reasonable diligence could not" . . . have discovered and
produced at the trial . . . " the evidence contained in the affidavits.
To be grounds for a new trial, newly-discovered evidence
cannot be merely cumulative (U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 175, 13 P.
673).

The only evidence on the issue of possible destruction by Bertha

and Helen was by Bertha, Helen and John.

However, their testimony was

equivocal, inconsistent and highly suspect.

Because the Shepards re-

fused to testify, and Grant Palmer's knowledge of the matter was unknown
to petitioners' attorneys, petitioners were unable to present any testimony whatsoever on this issue.

Thus, Mr. Palmer's testimony would not

be cumulative.
In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 380, 57 P.2d 708 (1936),
the plaintiff, after trial, discovered a disinterested witness who could
shed substantial light on a vital issue.

The trial court denied the

motion, but on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, stating:
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case is very
scant, newly discovered testimony on that point appearing from
affidavits in support of the motion for a .new trial to be apparently
reliable, when it appears that the movant for the new trial was not
quilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness for the
trial, and that there is no element of holding such witness in
reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial . . . and it appears
likely that such evidence would change the result, a new trial
should be granted.
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In the instant case, all the criteria for a new trial specified in
Jensen are present.

The testimony of Grant Palmer is that of a dis-

interested witness; he will gain nothing irrespective of the outcome.
It concerns a vital issue:

Possible destruction of the will by in-

terested parties--thus showing the will was in existence at the testator's death.

Since Palmer was present on the day in question, his

testimony is reliable and its reliability is strengthened by the Shepards''
affidavit.

Petitioners' attorneys were not negligent in not obtaining

the testimony:

They did not know it existed until shortly before the

trial when the Shepards refused to testify, and by that time it was too
late to obtain it.

Petitioners were not holding such witness in reserve

since they did not even know what his testimony would be.

And finally,

since that testimony is material since it is disinterested and explains
the inconsistency in the objectors' testimony, it could clearly change
the result of the trial.

This is especially true here where it now can

be shown that the objectors may have had access to decedent's important
papers, including his will.

(See Baumgarten v. Hoffman, 9 Utah 338, 34

P. 294 (1893); and Turner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24 (1892).)
In sum, the great majority of jurisdictions have held the term
"in existence" to mean legal existence.

Each of the cases holding

otherwise, California, Indiana, New York and Washington, is factually
distinguisable from the facts of the present case, and therefore they
are not applicable.

With the exception of Indiana, the cases from each
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of those jurisdictions which are factually similar to the instant case
have construed the section to require only legal existence.

There is no

Indiana case which is factually similar.
Si nee the overwhelming weight of authority holds that "legal
existence" is sufficient, the petitioners-appellants urge that the Utah
statute be construed to require a showing only of legal existence.

CONCLUSION
Since the purpose and intent of Section 75-3-26 Utah Code
Annotated is to prevent spurious wills from being probated, and where
there is evidence conclusively proving that the purported will is in
fact the will of the testator, and that he had no intent to revoke it as
his will, there is no justifiable reason to deny the will probate and
thereby thwart the testator's intent.

Especially is this so where, as

here, the only thing preventing the will from being probated is a rebuttable presumption of revocation.
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